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1. Introduction
Following the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958), researchers have proposed
several analytical models to explain the capital structure of firms. Subsequent empirical
studies based on these models have helped us to develop a basic understanding of the factors
that affect a firm’s capital structure decisions. However, these studies do not fully explain
the observed time series and the cross-sectional dynamics of corporate capital structures
documented in the literature. A review of the empirical literature provides evidence that
there are substantial variations in the speed of adjustment estimates, ranging from half a year
to six years.2 For instance, Welch (2004) finds that about 60% of year-to-year fluctuations
of firms’ leverage are due to firms’ issuance activity rather than of firms striving to achieve
any specific leverage target. Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that the effects of historical
market valuations on leverage are relatively long-lasting, suggesting firms do not actively
adjust their capital structure. Yet, several previous studies (e.g., Ozkan (2001), Flannery
and Rangan (2006), and Faulkender et al. (2012)), document evidence of a relatively rapid
adjustment toward the target. Overall, it seems that corporate leverage is mean reverting
at the firm level but the speed at which this happens is not a settled issue.
Is there a resolution to these conflicting results? Some researchers suggest that the
seemingly passive attitude of firms toward achieving leverage targets could be due to mis-
measurement of the speed of adjustment. It is argued that the standard models of leverage
lack power to separate the benefits of achieving targets from other motivations of financ-
ing (e.g., see Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Chang and Dasgupta (2009)).3 Others
indicate that estimated leverage adjustment speeds in previous studies are biased (e.g., see
Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Huang and Ritter (2009)).
2Table A, Appendix A, displays the speed of adjustment estimates recently reported in the literature.
3Researchers have used either the full-adjustment or the partial-adjustment model to examine firms’
optimal/target leverage. The full-adjustment model assumes that the adjustment to the specific target
leverage will be done in one step. In contrast, the partial adjustment model assumes that the firm will attain
the optimal leverage over time.
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Another reason why the speed of adjustment estimates differ could be due to variations in
the costs and benefits of capital structure adjustments across firms, which may be reflected
in variations in the speed at which firms adjust capital structure toward the target (e.g.,
Byoun (2008), Elsas and Florysiak (2010), Faulkender et al. (2012), and Dang et al. (2012)).
These studies indicate that firm-specific factors such as financing gaps, equity market val-
uations, firm size, profitability, and leverage deviations from the target cause asymmetries
in adjustment speed across firms. Other studies, such as Cook and Tang (2010), Drobetz
and Wanzenried (2006), and Haas and Peeters (2006), have related the asymmetric speed of
adjustment to macroeconomic conditions measured by real GDP.
The models that researchers have examined may have also suffered from omitted factors,
which play an important role in the adjustment of leverage. For instance, although it has
been shown that risk affects firms’ leverage decisions, the extent to which risk affects the
speed with which managers adjust firms’ capital structure has not been investigated.4 In our
investigation, we scrutinize the effect of risk on the speed of capital structure adjustments
by employing an approach similar to that in Byoun (2008).5 In particular we examine the
impact of time-varying firm-specific and macroeconomic risks on the speed of adjustment.
We estimate our models applying the System GMM dynamic panel data estimator. This
methodology allows us to overcome the biases arising from potential endogeneity, measure-
ment error, and the presence of the lagged dependent variable in the model.
We carry out the empirical investigation for a publicly quoted UK manufacturing firm-
level panel dataset over 1981–2009. We determine the optimal leverage of firms by estimating
a dynamic target leverage model, which includes several firm-specific variables along with
both macroeconomic and firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk measures. We then estimate two
4To our knowledge, using a partial-adjustment model, the only other paper that explores the role of risk
on capital adjustment problem is Dang et al. (2012). However, their risk measure is not time-varying, as
their model only focuses on the impact of firms’ earnings volatility in low vs. high regimes. Likewise, they
allow for differing speeds of adjustment for above-threshold and below-threshold financing imbalances, but
do not allow the speed of adjustment to vary with the magnitude of risk.
5Byoun (2008) investigates the importance of financial imbalances on capital adjustment when the firm
is above or below its target level of debt. However, his research is silent about the role of risk.
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interrelated models to examine the impact of risk on the capital adjustment problem. We
first examine the asymmetric effects of risk on the speed of adjustment when the firm’s
actual leverage is above or below the target leverage. We find that firms having leverage
above the target adjust their capital structure more rapidly when macroeconomic risk is low.
In contrast, firms with below-target leverage are more likely to adjust their capital structure
quickly toward their targets in times of low firm-specific risk and high macroeconomic risk.
This model provides our initial set of observations that risk affects the adjustment speed of
firms’ leverage.
We then extend this model to examine the role of risk in conjunction with financial
imbalances as the firm’s leverage lies above or below its target ratio. We find that firms
with financial surpluses and above-target leverage are likely to adjust their leverage more
quickly toward their target when macroeconomic risk is high but firm-specific risk is low.
This observation suggests that a firm that has a financial surplus with leverage exceeding the
target quickly readjusts its capital structure in periods of high macroeconomic risk to avoid
costs of financial distress along with the likelihood of bankruptcy. In contrast, we observe
that firms with financial surpluses and below-target leverage do not strive to achieve their
target capital structure, but rather maintain their current state. We argue that in a risky
environment, managers of firms with cash use their option to wait rather than inadvertently
adjusting the capital structure of the firm. We also find that firms that experience financial
deficits with above-target leverage are more likely to issue equity to achieve their target
leverage, particularly in times of low macroeconomic risk.6 For such firms, given the level
of macroeconomic risk, an increase in firm-specific risk accelerates the capital adjustment
process. Last we show that firms that have financial deficits with below-target leverage are
more likely to adjust their capital structure when both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks
are relatively low. An increase in either type of risk retards their process of adjustment.
We examine the robustness of our findings as we consider i) a target leverage estimate
6As good macroeconomic prospects (low macroeconomic risks) are positively related to the market value
of equity, firms generally issue new equity during such periods.
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without incorporating the role of risk factors, ii) an alternative definition of leverage mea-
sured by total debt/total assets, iii) generating firm-specific risks after controlling for effects
of macroeconomic conditions, iv) alternative measures of risk, and v) target leverage based
on historical leverage. The results from these alternative approaches confirm our initial ob-
servations. Overall, our investigation provides clear evidence that the type of risk (macroe-
conomic versus firm-specific) and the extent of risk which firms face matter for their capital
adjustment process. Our investigation clearly shows that risk exerts asymmetric effects on
the firm’s capital adjustment process, over and above the firms’ financial state or the extent
of firms’ actual leverage in comparison to the target. These findings are important in un-
derstanding managers’ actions given the increased risks associated with the recent financial
crisis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the hypotheses and our
expectations. Section 3 presents information on the dataset and describes the procedures we
implement to generate firm-specific and macroeconomic risk measures. Section 4 describes
the estimation methods. Section 5 presents the empirical findings and robustness checks,
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Hypotheses on Risk and Leverage Adjustments
Prior to laying out our hypotheses regarding the effects of macroeconomic and firm-
specific risks on the speed of adjustment toward a target leverage ratio as both macroe-
conomic and firm-specific risks vary over time, it is important to discuss the state of the
literature along these lines. A survey of the literature shows that several researchers have
rationalized the effects of macroeconomic risk on firm leverage referring to the financial
propagation mechanism. This literature suggests that macroeconomic volatility influences
the borrowers’ collateralizable net worth, and therefore affects their risk premium for exter-
nal funds. Changes in the risk premium in return influence the ability of the firms to borrow
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funds from potential lenders.7
These implications have been taken to data by many researchers. Gertler and Hubbard
(1993) show that firms opt for equity rather than debt contracts to shift at least some of
the business-cycle risk to their lenders during periods of higher macroeconomic risk. Baum
et al. (2009) empirically show that an increase in macroeconomic risk leads to a significant
decrease in firms’ optimal short-term leverage. Hatzinikolaou et al. (2002) find that inflation
uncertainty has a significant negative effect on a firm’s debt-equity ratio. More recently,
Bhamra et al. (2010) and Chen (2010) using a dynamic capital structure framework show
that unpredictable variations in macroeconomic conditions have a significant impact on firms’
financing policies. Specifically, Chen (2010) predicts that higher macroeconomic risks lead to
a decline in discounted value of expected tax benefits. As the advantages of an outstanding
debt stock fall, firms reduce their debt in bad times. Bhamra et al. (2010) argue that firms
become more conservative in their use of debt financing during bad states of the economy to
have financial flexibility rendering leverage to be pro-cyclical. Caglayan and Rashid (2014)
also show that macroeconomic risk is significantly and negatively related to the short-term
leverage of pubic and nonpublic UK manufacturing.8
Furthermore, there is a deep literature which has argued that firm-specific risk plays an
important role in explaining the firm’s target leverage. For instance, Fisher (1959) argues
that the risk premium which firms pay is significantly associated with their earnings volatility.
Likewise, Baxter (1967) documents that the variance of firms’ earnings has a negative impact
on firms’ desirability to rely on debt financing. Brealey and Myers (1981) also argue that
firms find financial distress to be costly regardless of the presence or absence of bankruptcy.
Firms therefore generally have a tendency to repress their financial distress costs, implying
that firms with relatively volatile potential future cash flow streams use less debt in their
7For theoretical underpinning regarding the effects of macroeconomic shocks on firms’ capital structure,
see, including others, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Gertler (1992), Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
8also see Almeida and Campello (2010), and O¨ztekin and Flannery (2012) along these lines who examined
inflation volatility effects on the firm’s capital structure.
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capital structure than the others. Using the tax shelter-bankruptcy cost model, Castanias
(1983) establishes an inverse relationship between business risk and a firms leverage. He
shows that with a given marginal tax rate and marginal default cost function, higher business
risk results in a decline in the debt level of firms. In line with bankruptcy cost theory, Bradley
et al. (1984) present a single period corporate capital structure model and show the presence
of an inverse relation of a firms optimal level of debt with its earnings volatility.9
Although the impact of risk on capital structure has been explored by several researchers,
risk effects on the adjustment speed toward the firm’s target leverage have not hitherto been
investigated. We hypothesize that as costs and benefits of rebalancing the capital structure
vary with the source of and variations in risk, so does the speed with which firms adjust
leverage toward their targets. Hence, we examine the role of risk on the speed of adjustment
of leverage while we consider firms’ financial status (financial surpluses or financial deficits)
and the state of firms’ actual leverage (above or below target leverage). In this context,
we consider two related empirical models. The first model examines the role of risk on the
adjustment speed when we take into account the deviation of leverage from the target, while
the second model allows us to investigate the effects of risk on the adjustment speed taking
into account both the financial state of the firm and the deviation of leverage from the target.
Model 1: Risk Effects Considering the State of Actual Leverage
The first model allows us to examine the impact of both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic
risks on the speed of adjustment of a firm whose actual leverage falls below or above its target
as the risk structure varies. We expect those firms whose actual leverage is above the target
to reduce their leverage during periods of low risk. This is because such firms will want to
reduce financial distress, which arises due to high levels of debt, by issuing equity or retiring
debt. The best time to proceed as such is when both business and macroeconomic risks are at
9Among others, Taub (1975), Ferri and Jones (1979), Marsh (1982), Titman and Wessels (1988), Wald
(1999), and Lemmon et al. (2008) present empirical evidence of a negative and statistically significant rela-
tionship between the firm-specific volatility/risk and leverage. Furthermore, several other studies, including
Choe et al. (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Drobetz et al. (2007), Cook
and Tang (2010), and Akhtar (Akhtar), arrive at the conclusion that business cycles significantly affects
firms’ capital structure.
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their lowest. In contrast, for firms whose leverage is below their target, we expect to see that
the adjustment will be faster during periods of high firm-specific risk, as firms experiencing
greater turbulence would prefer to reach their target leverage as quickly as possible. This can
be achieved more quickly when macroeconomic risks are low, as it is easier to raise external
funds in that environment.
It should be noted that the impact of risk on the adjustment speed should differ as the
firm’s actual leverage exceeds or falls below its target in comparison to the case when there
is no risk. For instance, if the firm’s actual leverage exceeds its target, then the presence
of risk will delay adjustment, as in a risky environment, the manager may prefer to have a
buffer cash stock rather than retiring its debt quickly. Yet, if the actual leverage is below its
target, the presence of risk may speed up the process, as the manager would prefer to adjust
the firm’s capital structure quickly.
Model 2: Risk Effects Considering the State of Actual Leverage and Financial Imbalances
As we examine the importance of risk, we next consider the effect of financial imbalances
on capital adjustment when the firm’s actual leverage is above or below its target leverage.
This leads to four alternative scenarios as the firm experiences a financial surplus or deficit
while their leverage is below or above the target.
Scenario 1 is that of a firm which experiences a financial surplus with above-target lever-
age. In principle, firms that have financial surpluses with above-target leverage can adjust
their capital structure by retiring debt. As high levels of debt increase the likelihood of
financial distress and firms’ risk exposures, firms with above-target debt are more likely to
quickly reverse excess deviations from their target leverage ratio. In fact, this reversal should
happen more rapidly when the firm is exposed to idiosyncratic or macroeconomic risks, as
the costs of distress will then be higher. Consequently, we expect that the speed of adjust-
ment will be highest when both risks are high. This suggests that the adjustment will take
place more quickly in a risky environment than in a no-risk environment. As the firm is rich
in cash, there is little reason for the manager to carry excessive debt and experience financial
distress.
8
Scenario 2 is that of a firm which experiences financial deficits with above-target leverage.
These firms are expected to reduce their actual leverage in order to offset deviations from
their leverage targets and to finance their fixed investments through external resources. The
optimal solution to this problem is to issue equity, which can be done most effectively when
the macroeconomic and idiosyncratic risks are low. Higher levels of risk will increase the costs
associated with issuing equity due to increased asymmetric information problems. Hence, an
increase in macroeconomic risk will hinder the adjustment process, as in such circumstances
investors reduce their demand for equity due to severe adverse selection problems. However,
an increase in firm-specific risk may not have such adverse effects, as the firm will issue
new equity through an investment bank that can evaluate its prospects and advise on the
issuance of equity. We expect that the speed of adjustment for such firms under risks will
be slower than the case in which there is no risk, as raising external funds through equity
issuance requires time as investors strive to evaluate the value of the company.
Scenario 3 is that of a firm which experiences a financial surplus with a below-target
leverage ratio. Such a firm faces no pressure to raise funds to finance operations by either
issuing new debt or repurchasing existing equity. The presence of risk or an increase of
either type of risk will induce these firms to adjust their capital structure more slowly, as
the associated costs would be higher in periods of high risk. Given that the manager of such
a firm under uncertainty would rather have the option to change capital structure in the
future, adjustment will be slow.
Scenario 4 is that of a firm which experiences a financial deficit with below-target leverage.
In this case, new financing is needed by firms to adjust their capital structure toward the
target leverage. Because the firm’s actual leverage is below its target, this objective can be
achieved by raising funds by issuing debt. Prior empirical research has shown that leverage
is negatively affected by risk. Hence, we expect that the speed of adjustment under risk
will be highest when both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks are low. However, we also
expect that in the presence of risk the speed of adjustment will be higher than the case when
there is no risk in the environment.
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In all scenarios, we expect that the speed of adjustment in the presence of risk will differ
from the case when there is no risk. Furthermore, we do not expect to see any symmetry
over different scenarios and as the extent of risk changes from one level to another. Hence,
we expect to find that risk plays an important role in the speed of adjustment of leverage.
3. Data
Our investigation uses a firm-level unbalanced annual panel dataset for the United King-
dom. The data are obtained from the WorldScope Global database via DataStream and
cover the period 1981–2009. The analysis is carried out for manufacturing firms, each of
which contributes at least five years of observations.10,11 As routinely implemented in the
literature (see, for instance, Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007)),
we drop firm-year observations if the ratio of book leverage is greater than one. All re-
maining firm-specific variables are scaled by total assets and are winsorised at the first and
ninety-ninth percentile to eliminate the adverse effects of outliers and misreported data.12
Following earlier empirical studies, including Baker and Wurgler (2002), Alti (2006), and
Kayhan and Titman (2007), we define book equity as total assets minus total liabilities and
preferred stock plus deferred taxes and convertible debt. Book debt is equal to total assets
minus book equity. Book leverage is then defined as the ratio of book debt to total assets.
We investigate book leverage rather than market leverage because market leverage is very
sensitive to the market value of equity, which can change substantially due to movements in
equity markets even if firms do not alter their actual borrowing. In addition, firms’ managers
are more concerned about the book value of debt ratio because banks and other financial
institutions utilize the book value of debt in ascertaining the creditworthiness of a firm.
Similarly, credit-rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and A.M. Best, also
10We mitigate sample selection and survivorship biases by allowing for both entry and exit in the sample.
11We restrict our attention to those firms which contribute at least five years of observations to gener-
ate meaningful measures of risk at the firm level and to properly instrument the endogenous variables in
estimating our model.
12The data screening we implement here is commonly applied in the literature ( e.g., see, including others,
Brav (2009), Baum et al. (2009), Kayhan and Titman (2007), and Baker and Wurgler (2002)).
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consider the book value of debt in determining a firm’s credit rating.13
Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales. Asset tangibility is equal to the ratio
of net plant, property, and equipment to the book value of total assets. Profitability is the
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the book value of total assets.
The two-year stock return is defined as the percentage change between share prices at time
t− 2 and share prices at time t. The market-to-book value ratio is equal to book debt plus
market equity divided by the book value of total assets. Market equity is common shares
outstanding multiplied by the market price of each share. The non-debt tax shield is defined
as total depreciation expense divided by the book value of total assets.
To investigate the impact of risk on firms’ financial decisions, we consider two types of
risk: firm-specific risk, derived from firms’ sales to total assets ratio, and macroeconomic
risk, which is computed using real gross domestic product (GDP).14 Details on all variables
are given in Table B of Appendix B.
3.1. Measuring Firm-Specific Risk
We estimate an autoregressive model of order one (AR(1)) for firms’ annual sales nor-
malized by the book value of total assets to generate firm-specific risk based on the residuals
of the model as suggested in Caglayan and Rashid (2014) and Bo (2002). We estimate the
following model for each firm:
Salesi,t = µi + ϕSalesi,t−1 + ζi,t (1)
where Salesi,t is the ratio of sales to book value of total assets for firm i at time t, µi cap-
tures the fixed effects, ϕ is the autoregressive parameter, and ζi,t is the error term with zero
mean and finite variance. We obtain the residuals from the above AR(1) process for each
firm and compute the cumulative variance of the obtained residuals. Specifically, the risk
proxy for 2000 is constructed by calculating the variance of the residuals obtained from the
13See Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) along these lines.
14Seasonally adjusted quarterly data spanning 1975Q1-2009Q4 on UK real GDP are taken from the Office
for National Statistics (ONS) database (Pn: A2: ABMI: Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measure).
11
AR(1) model of sales that uses data for 2000 and 1999. Similarly, the risk measure for 2001
is constructed calculating the variance of the residuals obtained from the same model using
the data for 2001, 2000 and 1999. The process is repeated similarly. The downside of this
approach is the loss of one observation per firm. The square root of the estimated cumulative
variance, denoted by Rfirmi,t , is used as a proxy for firm-specific risk in the empirical inves-
tigation. Given that each firm contributes at least five years of observations, the measure
above uses a minimum of four observations to generate the risk measure.
3.2. Measuring Macroeconomic Risk
To generate a proxy for macroeconomic risk, we estimate an ARCH model on quarterly
real GDP over 1975–2009. We include an AR(1) term in the mean equation of our ARCH(1)
specification and estimate the following model:
∆GDPt = ω + η∆GDPt−1 + t (2)
σ2t = α + β
2
t−1 (3)
where ω is a constant term and η is the autoregressive parameter. The estimated conditional
variance, σˆ2t , is the one-period-ahead forecast variance based on prior information. α is the
constant and t|∆GDPt−1 ∼ N(0, σ2t−1) is the innovation in real GDP.
The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The conditional variance,
σˆ2t , is then annualized averaging over four quarters to match the frequency of the firm level
data. The generated series is denoted by Rmacrot and used as a proxy for macroeconomic risk.
The ARCH coefficient (β = 0.781) is less than one and is statistically significant at the 1%
level.
3.3. Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the firm-specific variables for the full sample
as well as three subperiods. Book leverage, with a mean of 0.574 for the full sample, has
increased over time suggesting that firms, on average, were less levered and were not as
actively involved in altering their leverage in the 1980s in comparison to the later years of
the sample period.
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The average fixed capital expenditures (investment) to book value of total assets ratio is
0.059 for the entire sample period. In contrast to leverage, it appears that the investment rate
has declined over the sample period. Similar patterns can be observed for firms’ profitability.
On average, firms were more profitable during the first ten years of the sample period.
Reductions in average profitability during the last nine years of the sample could be one of
the reasons why firms’ fixed capital investment, on average, has declined.
The average two-year stock return is 0.098 for the full sample period, yet it is negative
with a value of -0.134 and a high standard deviation during the last nine years of the sample
period. Firms’ share prices rose in the 1990s, as average stock returns are positive and
higher than in the other two subperiods. The mean values of tangibility and firm size,
measured by the log of total net sales, are 0.287 and 11.141, respectively, for the whole
sample period. Inspecting the behavior of both variables, we see that while the means of
both series monotonically declined, their volatility increased over time. Finally, we observe
that the average non-debt tax shield for the full sample is 0.052, yet it exhibits an increasing
trend over the years.
Overall, the summary statistics across the three subperiods show that firms are relatively
more leveraged, earn lower returns on their assets, have lower fixed investment expenditures,
and have a declining trend in their equity value in the later years of the sample, particularly
over the 2001–09 period.
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of our risk measures for the full sample and
subsamples. The table shows that firm-specific risk has consistently increased over time.
Specifically, the average firm-specific risk during the 1980s and 1990s was considerably less
than that of the 2001–09 period. We also observe that firm-specific risk was more volatile
during the last nine years of the sample, as its standard deviation is higher in these years com-
pared to the 1980s and the 1990s. This implies that firms experienced greater risks associated
with their operations in the latter years of the sample. Similar to the case of firm-specific
risk, macroeconomic risk also appears to be on the rise throughout the period of investiga-
tion. Further, the estimated standard deviations provide evidence that the macroeconomic
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environment is more volatile over the 2001–2009 period as compared to earlier years.
In summary, both macroeconomic risk and firm-specific risk have increased markedly
and became more volatile over the recent years: quite understandably, as the financial crisis
towards the end of the sample period took its toll on businesses and the economy.15
4. Empirical Implementation
We present two models to examine the effects of both firm-specific and macroeconomic
risk measures on the adjustment of capital structure. The first model allows us to investigate
the role of risk on the speed of adjustment of the capital structure when firms’ actual leverage
is below or above the target. The second model, an extension of the first model, allows us to
examine the effects of risk as we consider the state of firms’ financial balances and the state
of firms’ actual leverage with respect to the target.
4.1. The Target Adjustment Model
We compute the firm-specific target debt ratio, LTi,t, using the following specification:
LTi,t = β1Xi,t−1 + β2R
firm
i,t−1 + β3R
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t (4)
where Xi,t is a vector of firm-specific variables that includes the lagged value of lever-
age, the market-to-book value ratio, firm profitability, asset tangibility, capital investment
expenditures-to-total assets ratio, two-year stock returns, non-debt tax shields and the log
of firm sales as a proxy for firm size. The model contains time-varying firm-specific and
macroeconomic volatility measures as denoted by Rfirmi,t and R
macro
t , respectively.
16 The
term υi captures time-invariant unobservable firm-specific fixed effects. The term i,t is the
idiosyncratic error term.17
15The empirical correlation of the risk measures of 0.002 implies that each measure covers a different aspect
of risk associated with the business and macroeconomic environment that firms face in their operations.
16Earlier research has shown that both volatility measures affect the firm’s capital structure.
17The results of the target leverage model are given in Table C of Appendix C.
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Given the firm-specific target leverage from equation (4), LT , we can examine the ad-
justment speed toward the target using the following model:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = φ(LTi,t − Li,t−1) + i,t (5)
In this model, Li,t is the observed (actual) leverage of firm i in year t. The adjustment
coefficient φ measures how quickly firms adjust their capital structure to attain their target
leverage. This coefficient should strictly lie between zero and one if there are positive costs
of adjustment. When the cost of adjustment is high, the adjustment coefficient would not
be statistically different from zero. If the cost of deviating from the target is higher than
the cost of adjustment, the adjustment coefficient would be larger, so that the speed of
adjustment will be faster.
4.1.1. Risk and Capital Adjustment: Controlling for Deviations from the Target Leverage
Equation (5) does not incorporate the effect of risk on the speed of adjustment coefficient.
This model also does not allow for asymmetry in adjustment speeds as firms’ actual leverage
deviates from the target. Here, we introduce both macroeconomic and firm-specific risk to
the model while we take into account actual leverage deviations from target leverage. In
doing so we address two issues: (i) do firms weigh deviations of actual leverage from their
leverage targets differently in times of greater risk? and (ii) does risk have differential effects
for firms with above-target leverage and firms with below-target leverage?
If a firm’s actual leverage exceeds its target, then the firm can adjust its capital structure
to reach its target debt ratio by retiring debt or by issuing new equity. In contrast, if a firm’s
leverage is below its target, we would expect that the firm can restructure by issuing new
debt or repurchasing equity. Yet, the speed with which firms adjust their capital structure
will depend on the risk structure of the environment along with whether firms are above or
below their target leverage ratio. We expect that firms adjust their leverage asymmetrically,
as the risk structure of the environment within which firms operate changes will cause the
firm to give different weights to positive and negative deviations of actual leverage from the
target. Hence, we modify equation (5) by interacting our risk measures with indicators that
15
capture the state of current leverage with respect to target leverage as follows:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dabovi,t + β2Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t + (β3Dabovi,t + β4Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t ×Rfirmi,t−1
+ (β5D
abov
i,t + β6D
belo
i,t )DV Tit ×Rmacrot−1 + υi + εi,t (6)
where DV Ti,t = L
T
i,t − Li,t−1 denotes the deviation of the firm’s actual leverage from the
target leverage at time t, where LT is the predicted value from equation (4). Dabovi,t is a
dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for
firm i at time t. Similarly, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is
below the target and zero otherwise. It may seem that the best time to adjust the capital
structure of the firm is when both business and macroeconomic risks are at their lowest.
However, given that firms experience different levels of macroeconomic and business risks
at each point in time, managers are expected to weigh deviations from target differently as
either type of risk varies along with other factors that affect the adjustment process.
4.1.2. Risk and Capital Adjustment: Controlling for Deviations from the Leverage Target
and Financial Imbalances
According to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order model, there is a hierarchy in
firms’ financing decisions. Several researchers, among others, including Leary and Roberts
(2005) and Strebulaev (2007), empirically show that firms prefer to use internally generated
funds (e.g., retained earnings) over external financing and prefer debt over equity. Frank and
Goyal (2003) document that an imbalance in cash flows plays a central role in the pecking
order. Kayhan and Titman (2007) report that financial deficits have a strong influence on
capital structure which is partly reversed over long horizons. They show that the effect
of financial status on capital structure is stronger when firms raise capital (i.e., firms have
financial deficits) than when firms retire external capital (i.e., firms have financial surpluses).
Byoun (2008) proposes a financial needs-induced adjustment framework to investigate how
firms adjust their capital structure toward target debt levels. He finds that firms adjust their
leverage more rapidly when their leverage is above the target if they experience a financial
surplus, or when their leverage is below the target while they experience a financial deficit.
16
Given the empirical evidence, it appears that firms are more likely to adjust their capital
structure toward their target debt levels when they face imbalances in their cash flows which
lead to financial deficits or surpluses. However, this line of research has not yet examined the
role of risks for the speed of adjustment. To examine how risk affects the impact of financial
conditions on the speed of adjustment for firms with above-target or below-target leverage,
we augment equation (6) by incorporating an interaction term between our measures of risk,
above-target and below-target indicators, and the financial status of the firm:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t Dabovi,t + β2Ddefi,t Dabovi,t + β3Dsuri,t Dbeloi,t + β4Ddefi,t Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t (7)
+ (β5D
sur
i,t D
abov
i,t + β6D
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i,t D
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sur
i,t D
belo
i,t + β8D
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i,t D
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i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rfirmi,t
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i,t D
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As defined earlier, DV Ti,t = L
T
i,t−Li,t−1, where LTi,t is the estimated target leverage ratio
for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a financial surplus
at time t and zero otherwise, and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a
financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. The term υi captures firm-specific fixed effects
and the term εi,t represents the idiosyncratic errors.
We should note that to calculate the imbalances in cash flows (financial deficits/surpluses),
we follow Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Byoun (2008) and utilize the cash flow identity
CFi,t − CAPEi,t −∆WCi,t ≡ DIVi,t −∆di,t −∆ei,t (8)
where CFi,t is the operating cash flow after interest and taxes, CAPEi,t denotes capital
expenditures, ∆WCi,t denotes changes in working capital, DIVi,t denotes payments of div-
idends, ∆di,t is equal to net debt issues and ∆ei,t denotes net equity issues.
18 Rearranging
18Net equity issues are defined as the ratio of the change in book equity minus the change in retained
earnings to total assets. Newly retained earnings are the change in balance sheet retained earnings during
an accounting year period divided by the book value of total assets. Net debt issues are then defined as
the ratio of the change in total assets to total assets less the sum of net equity issues and newly retained
earnings.
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equation (8), we define a firm’s financial deficit (FDi,t) as:
FDi,t = CAPEi,t + ∆WCi,t +DIVi,t − CFi,t ≡ ∆di,t + ∆ei,t (9)
Hence, a positive FDi,t implies a financial deficit and a negative value of FDi,t implies a
financial surplus.
5. Empirical Analysis
Although researchers have used fixed-effects approach to estimate firms’ speed of adjust-
ment toward their target leverage, this approach would not be appropriate in a panel data
model which incorporates the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. The fixed-effects
estimator suffers from a downward ‘Nickell bias’ on the estimate of the lagged dependent
variable’s coefficient, leading to overestimation of the speed of adjustment: a particularly se-
rious problem in short panels.19 Likewise, the use of first differencing introduces a correlation
between the lagged dependent variable and the error, necessitating the use of instrumental
variables techniques.
In this paper, we apply the System GMM dynamic panel data estimator. The time-
invariant unobservable firm-specific effects are removed by taking the first difference of each
underlying variable as we control for the correlation between the regressors and the errors.
In addition, using the System GMM method, we can mitigate the presence of endogeneity
by instrumenting differenced equations with lagged levels of the variables and equations in
levels with the lags of the first differences of the variables. Last but not the least, the GMM
approach allows us to avoid problems that may arise due to the use of generated regressors.
However, in the context of GMM estimation, the use of longer lags may not provide
enough additional information, and the use of extra instruments may lead to the problem
of many instruments relative to the sample size, which weakens the power of the overi-
dentification test (Roodman (2009)). Here, we confirm the validity of our instruments by
implementing the J test of Hansen (1982). We also apply the Arellano-Bond AR(2) test to
19See Nickell (1981), Bond (2002), and Judson and Owen (1999) for more on related issues.
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examine the presence of second-order serial correlation in the residuals. These diagnostic
test statistics along with the number of firms and the firm-year observations are reported
in Panel B of each table that we present below. For all cases, the J statistics show that
the instruments used for the System GMM estimator are valid and satisfy the orthogonality
conditions. Also, the serial correlation tests do not detect second-order serial correlation in
the residuals. For brevity, we do not comment further on these diagnostics.
5.1. Risk Effects After Controlling for Deviations from the Target Leverage
Table 3 presents the results for equation (6) where we first set both risk measures to
zero to obtain a benchmark. The results for this specification are given under Model 1.
The benchmark results show that firms with above-target leverage (DV Ti,t ×Dabovit ) adjust
their capital structure faster than firms with below-target leverage (DV Ti,t ×Dbeloit ). These
findings for UK firms are in line with those of Byoun (2008), who considers US firms.
Model 2 incorporates the effect of risk into the baseline specification and shows that both
firm-specific and macroeconomic risks have asymmetric effects on the speed of adjustment,
depending on whether the firm’s actual leverage exceeds or falls short of the target leverage.
The impact of firm-specific risk interacted with the below-target indicator (DV Ti,t×Dbeloi,t ×
Rfirmi,t−1) is negative and statistically significant. This implies that an increase in firm-level
risk deters firms from adjusting their capital structure toward their targets. In contrast, the
impact of firm-specific risk when actual leverage is above-target (DV Ti,t × Dabovi,t × Rfirmi,t−1)
is positive, but not statistically significant. Thus, firm-specific risk accelerates the capital
structure adjustment process only when the firm’s actual leverage lies above the target.
Macroeconomic risk has also a significant role regardless of whether the firm’s actual
leverage is above or below the target. We find that macroeconomic risk has a negative im-
pact on the adjustment speed of firms with above-target leverage (DV Ti,t×Dabovi,t ×Rmacrot−1 ),
whereas, it has a positive effect on the adjustment process of firms with below-target lever-
age (DV Ti,t × Dbeloi,t × Rmacrot−1 ). Firms with actual leverage above (below) the target are
likely to adjust their leverage more slowly (more quickly) toward the target in periods when
macroeconomic risk is high.
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5.1.1. The Speed of Adjustment controlling for Deviations from the Target Leverage
Using the estimates given in Table 3, we compute the speed of adjustment when risk takes
on high, medium, and low levels for firms with above- and below-target leverage and report
these values along their standard errors in Table 4.20 The adjustment speeds are statistically
different from zero for each firm category and vary as both types of risk change when firms’
actual leverage is above or below the target leverage. It should also be noted that the speed
of adjustment when there is risk is different from that computed for the benchmark model
with no risk. This suggests that omission of risk factors in estimating the adjustment of the
firms’ capital structure leads to biased results.
Inspecting Table 4, we see that the speed of adjustment for the benchmark model with
above target leverage, at 32.2%, is greater (yielding a lower half-life) than the remaining
cases when risk is introduced. In fact, the table presents an interesting ordering of the
speed of adjustment estimates as risk takes on different levels. The speed of adjustment
is highest (i.e., lowest half-life) when macroeconomic risk is low. There is a monotonic
increase as firm-specific risk increases from low to medium and high levels within each level
of macroeconomic risk. This observation accords with intuition. As macroeconomic risk
increases, a firm will find it harder to adjust its capital structure, for retiring debt will be
costlier in such circumstances due to increased asymmetric information problems.
The estimated speed of adjustment for firms with below-target leverage is around 24.7%
per year for the benchmark model. Adjustment is faster when firm-specific risk is low than
when it is high.
On the whole, the estimates given in Table 4 show that firms adjust their actual leverage
toward their targets at different speeds as they face different levels of risk when the actual
leverage is above or below their target levels. That is, firms consider the levels of firm-specific
and macroeconomic risk as well as positive and negative deviations of actual leverage from
20The standard errors associated with adjustment speed estimate are estimated and reported in the table
to test whether the estimated speed of adjustment statistically differs from zero. We compute these standard
errors by taking partial derivatives of the estimated equation (6) with respective to DV Ti,t, which is the
deviation of observed (actual) leverage from the target leverage.
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the target when adjusting their capital structure.
5.2. Risk Effects After Controlling for Deviations from the Leverage Target and Financial
Imbalances
Table 5 provides the results for two models based on equation (15) as we incorporate
the role of financial imbalances along with deviation of leverage from the target on the
adjustment of capital structure: while the benchmark Model 1 excludes both types of risk,
Model 2 includes them.
Model 1: The Benchmark
The benchmark model provides evidence that UK manufacturing firms increase their
leverage whether they face a financial deficit or surplus, as the coefficients of Dsuri,t and D
def
i,t
are both positive. This is in line with the statistics provided in Table 1, which show that
firm leverage in the UK has been increasing over the period of investigation. According to
the benchmark model, firms with a financial surplus tend to increase their leverage more
than those that experience a financial deficit. This observation is in contrast to that of
Byoun (2008), who shows that US manufacturing firms with a financial surplus reduce their
leverage. An inspection of the data shows that the increase in leverage in the UK is due to
issuance of new debt instruments rather than equity repurchases.
Next, we examine the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms between firms’ fi-
nancial status (financial surpluses/deficits) and above- and below-target indicators. The
coefficient estimates for Dsuri,t ×DV Ti,t ×Dabovi,t and that of Ddefi,t ×DV Ti,t ×Dabovi,t are both
positive and statistically significant, while the former is significantly larger. This implies
that firms whose actual leverage is above the target adjust their capital structure toward the
target relatively faster when they have a financial surplus than when they face a financial
deficit. The estimate of the coefficient on the interaction between firms’ financial deficits
and below-target leverage (Ddefi,t ×DV Ti,t×Dbeloi,t ) is positive and statistically significant but
smaller in magnitude than that of above-target leverage, regardless of the financial status
of the firm. Firms experiencing financial deficits with below-target leverage adjust their
leverage, but at a lower speed than those with above-target leverage. Interestingly, we also
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find that firms with a financial surplus do not strive to revert to the target level when their
leverage is below target. Rather, these firms further deviate from the target, as the coeffi-
cient estimate on the financial surplus with below-target interaction (Dsuri,t ×DV Ti,t×Dbeloi,t )
is negative and statistically significant.
The results from our benchmark model provide evidence that capital structure adjust-
ments are asymmetric and related to firms’ cash flow imbalances as well as the stance of firms’
actual leverage versus their target leverage. In Model 2 below, we explore whether the intro-
duction of the firm-specific and macroeconomic risk interaction terms into the benchmark
model would reveal further asymmetries in the leverage adjustment process.
Model 2: A. The Asymmetric Impact of Firm-Specific Risk
Before interpreting the effects of risk on adjustment speeds it would be useful to statis-
tically test the relevance of both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk in explaining asym-
metries in speed of adjustment. To perform this, we impose the parametric restriction on
the estimated coefficient of interaction terms between both types of risks and firms’ finan-
cial status (financial surpluses/deficits) and above- and below-target indicators: that is,
H0 : β5 = β6 = β7 = β8 = β9 = β10 = β11 = β12 = 0. The estimated value of F-statistic
(F-stat = 11.63; p-value = 0.000) provides significant evidence of the rejection of the null
hypothesis.21 This implies that firm-specific as well as macroeconomic risk factors are rele-
vant for capital structure adjustment decisions of firms. The restriction test results as well
as the estimated coefficients are in agreement with the proposed hypotheses, as the p-values
are less than 0.05 for seven out of eight estimated coefficients.
Turning to the influence of risk on adjustment, we find that the effect of firm-specific risk
on firms with a financial surplus and above-target leverage (Dsuri,t ×DV Ti,t×Dabovei,t ×Rfirmt−1 )
is negative and statistically significant. Firms enjoying a financial surplus with above-target
leverage slow down their capital adjustment when firm-specific risk is high. Hence, we expect
21We also test the relevance of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk in estimating the adjustment of firms’
leverage separately. In both cases, we reject the linear restriction on the parameters, as the p-values are less
than 0.05, suggesting the importance of both types of risks in adjustment of the firm’s capital structure.
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that firms with above-target leverage and financial surpluses use their surplus to reduce their
outstanding debt when these firms are more certain about their expected future cash flows. In
contrast, the effect of firm-specific risk on firms that have financial deficits with above-target
leverage (Ddefi,t × DV Ti,t × Dabovei,t × Rfirmt−1 ) is positive and significant. Firms with above-
target leverage experiencing a financial deficit are more likely to issue equity to finance their
financial deficits when they experience periods of high firm-specific risk. As debt becomes
relatively more expensive for risky firms when banks and other financial institutions charge
higher risk premiums, these firms tend to prefer equity over debt financing.
For firms with financial surpluses and below-target leverage, we find that the variable
(Dsuri,t ×DV Ti,t×Dbeloi,t ×Rfirmt−1 ) has a positive coefficient, implying that an increase in firm-level
risk leads to an increase in the speed of adjustment toward the level of target leverage. This
suggests that below-target firms with financial surpluses tend to repurchase their equity in
periods when they experience high firm-specific risk. These firms move their leverage toward
the target by reducing their outstanding external financing. The effect of firm-specific risk
on firms with financial deficits and below-target leverage (Ddefi,t ×DV Ti,t ×Dbeloi,t ×Rfirmt−1 ) is
negative, so that these firms slow their capital adjustment process when firm-specific risk is
high. They are more likely to attain their target leverage by issuing debt when firm-specific
risk is low. Firms do so because they face fewer debt-related problems, such as an increased
likelihood of bankruptcy, in periods of low firm-specific risk.
Model 2: B. The Asymmetric Impact of Macroeconomic Risk
The estimated impacts of macroeconomic risk on the change in leverage when firms
experience financial deficits with above-target leverage (Ddefi,t × DV Ti,t × Dabovei,t × Rmacrot−1 )
and that for firms with financial deficits and below-target (Ddefi,t ×DV Ti,t ×Dbeloi,t ×Rmacrot−1 )
are both negative and statistically significant. In other words, firms in these two groups
adjust their leverage toward their targets faster in periods when macroeconomic risks are
low. Firms facing financial deficits with above-target (below-target) leverage are more likely
to finance their financial deficits and adjust their leverage to the target by issuing equity
(debt) when macroeconomic risks are low. Firms with financial deficits, regardless of whether
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their observed leverage is below or above the target, may face low adjustment costs when
macroeconomic conditions are stable and certain, encouraging adjustments in their capital
structure.
In cases where firms have a financial surplus along with above-target leverage, the effect of
macroeconomic risk on the change in leverage (Dsuri,t ×DV Ti,t×Dabovei,t ×Rmacrot−1 ) is positive and
statistically significant. These firms adjust their leverage more rapidly in periods of higher
macroeconomic risk. This finding is in line with the fact that high levels of outstanding
debt tend to expose firms to macroeconomic shocks and, as a result, firms are more likely
to reduce their use of debt during volatile states of the economy. Last but not least, we find
that the effect of macroeconomic risk on the change in leverage when firms have a financial
surplus with below-target leverage (Dsuri,t ×DV Ti,t ×Dbeloi,t × Rmacrot−1 ) is positive, suggesting
that such firms use their financial surpluses to repurchase existing equity in order to reduce
overall external financing when macroeconomic risks are high.
The results given in Table 5 provide evidence that asymmetric speeds of adjustment are
related to risk, above and beyond the state of the firm’s leverage and its financial imbalances.
Further, the results suggest that both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks have differential
effects on capital structure adjustment decisions of firms. Therefore, we argue that omission
of these factors will yield biased conclusions on capital structure adjustments.
5.2.1. The Speed of Adjustment controlling for Financial Imbalances and Deviations from
Target Leverage
We now consider the speed of adjustment toward the leverage target, allowing risk to
vary across low, medium, and high levels. We compute the adjustment speed and the cor-
responding half-life in four-way interactions with respect to financial imbalances of the firm
(financial deficits/surpluses) and the positive or negative deviation of actual leverage from
the target. For each sub-panel, we also compute the adjustment speed and the corresponding
half-life when both types of risks are set to zero. The results given in Table 6 show that
firms’ speed of adjustment toward the target leverage changes significantly as the level of
risk varies.
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Sorting by the speeds of adjustment, we see that firms with a financial surplus and above-
target leverage adjust their capital structure more quickly when macroeconomic risk is high;
the speed of adjustment falls with a decline in macroeconomic risk. Although an increase
in firm-specific risk slows down the adjustment process, its impact is minor compared to
that of macroeconomic risk. For instance, when macroeconomic risk is high and firm-specific
risk is low (high), the estimated speed of adjustment is 82.5% (80.6%). Firms that enjoy a
financial surplus with above-target leverage reduce their outstanding debt more quickly as
macroeconomic risk increases to escape from the financial distress. Also note that the speed
of adjustment for this category of firms is significantly faster than the benchmark case.
When we compute the speed of adjustment for firms that have financial surpluses with
below-target leverage, we observe an interesting phenomenon: (i) these firms deviate from
their target leverage when there is zero risk, and (ii) these firms do not significantly adjust
their capital structure when they experience risk. In general, the estimated adjustment
speeds for these firms are negative but not statistically different from zero. Given that these
firms experience financial surplus, we argue that firms’ managers choose the option to wait
before adjusting their firms’ capital structure when the environment is risky.
We next examine the capital structure adjustment of those firms that have financial
deficits with above-target leverage. We see that these firms have the highest speed of adjust-
ment coefficient (the lowest half-life estimate) when we set both types of risk to zero. Once
we incorporate the effects of risk, the adjustment coefficient size changes dramatically. These
firms adjust most quickly when macroeconomic risk is low and when firm-specific risk is high,
with the slowest adjustment occurring when macroeconomic risk is high and firm-specific risk
is low. A potential explanation behind this observation is that as the adjustment process
requires issuing equity in the presence of a financial deficit, changing the capital structure
in a risky environment is not a trivial process.22 As a consequence, the speed of adjustment
in a risky environment is significantly slower in comparison to the benchmark model.
22Unpredictable variations in macroeconomic conditions may cause rapid variations in firms’ market value,
rendering the issuance of equity an unattractive source of finance for managers.
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The last case includes firms that have financial deficits with below-target leverage. We
observe that such firms adjust most rapidly when both firm-specific and macroeconomic
risks are low, with an estimated speed of adjustment of less than 30% per year. We also
find that the fastest adjustment takes places when both types of risk are low, with the
speed of adjustment falling to at 24% per year. Because firms in this group must issue new
debt to raise funds, they can do so more easily when they are relatively more certain about
their potential cash flow stream and when macroeconomic prospects are favorable. This
is in line with the fact that firms are less cautious about the cost of financial distress and
bankruptcy in periods of low risk, and thus, they tend to increase their use of debt. Here,
too, the difference in the speed of adjustment between the benchmark and the other cases
is significant.
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 provide evidence that firms’ adjustment speeds are
affected asymmetrically with respect to either type of risk while we control for their financial
imbalances and deviations of actual leverage from the target. Risk accelerates the speed
of adjustment for firms with a financial surplus and above-target leverage and retards the
speed of adjustment for firms with a financial deficit and below-target leverage.
These observations are of interest because they suggest that the differences in the adjust-
ment speeds are not fully explained by the imbalances of firms’ cash flows nor by deviations
from a leverage target: they are also significantly affected by the levels of firm-specific and
macroeconomic risk. In other words the introduction of both types of risk factors into the
model has a significant impact on our estimates. Hence, our findings are useful in inter-
preting earlier research which questions why firms are not always responsive to changes in
the market value of their equity (Welch (2004)) or gains and losses in their earnings (Hov-
akimian et al. (2004)) and why they are sensitive to debt and equity market conditions when
financing external capital (Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Antoniou et al. (2009)).
5.3. Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate five different specifications as we
consider i) target leverage estimates without risk factors, ii) an alternative definition of
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leverage measured by total debt/total assets, iii) generating the firm-specific risk measure
after controlling for effects of macroeconomic conditions, iv) alternative measures of risk,
and v) target leverage based on historical leverage.
Table 7 provides the results when we use the target leverage estimated without including
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk into the specification. We then estimate equation (15).
One can observe that the results presented in the table are similar to our earlier findings. In
particular, we observe that firms with a financial surplus and above-target leverage adjust
their capital structure towards the target faster when they face risk, whereas, firms with a
financial deficit and below-target leverage slow down their adjustment process when they
face risk.
Table 8 provides the results when we use the ratio of total debt (short-term debt +
long-term debt) to total assets as a measure of leverage rather than our broader measure
of leverage.23 The estimated adjustment speeds are similar to those presented in Table
6. Specifically, we observe that firms with a financial surplus and above-target leverage
adjust their capital structure towards the target faster when firm-specific risk is low and
macroeconomic risk is high. Yet, firms with a financial deficit and below-target leverage
change their capital structure when both types of risk are set to zero. We also observe that
firms with a financial deficit and above-target leverage do not significantly adjust their capital
structure towards their target when macroeconomic risk is high. These results indicate that
our initial observations that asymmetries in adjustment speed are attributed to the type of
risk and its magnitude even after controlling for firms’ current leverage and their financial
position are robust to the use of a narrower leverage measure.
We also check the robustness of risk effects on the estimated speed of adjustment by
considering a macroeconomic conditions-adjusted firm-specific risk measure. To generate
23We consider this narrow measure of leverage as an alternative measure because most of the previous
studies in the empirical capital structure literature have utilized this measure (e.g., see Ozkan (2001), Flan-
nery and Rangan (2006), and Dang et al. (2012) ). However, it should be noted that the broader leverage
measure has also been used by several researchers in the literature including Iliev and Welch (2010), Chang
and Dasgupta (2009), and Kayhan and Titman (2007).
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this new measure of firm-specific risk, we augment the sales specification in equation (1) by
including the log of real GDP and CPI as additional explanatory variables to control for
macroeconomic conditions. We do this because one may argue that the firm-specific risk
measure obtained from a simple AR model (see equation (1)) for sales may not reflect the
true firm-specific risks as the sales of a firm depend on macroeconomic conditions as well.
The estimated adjustment speeds with this macroeconomic conditions-adjusted firm-specific
risk, given in Table 9, are, similar to those presented in Table 6. The results from this
investigation further confirm the robustness of our findings.
Finally, we check the robustness of our findings by using the historical mean of the firm
leverage as a proxy for the firm’s target leverage ratio in our estimation and alternative
measures of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. In doing so, we use cash flow volatility as
an alternative firm-specific risk, which is also utilized by Lemmon et al. (2008) and Leary
and Roberts (2005). In carrying out this examination, we used a consumer price index based
volatility measure as an alternative proxy for macroeconomic risk. The results, which we
provide in Table 10, are similar to our earlier findings. Hence, we suggest that the effects of
risks on capital structure adjustments are not driven by the specific measure of risk or the
specific target leverage estimate.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Despite the evidence that both idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risks affect firms’ capital
structure, researchers have not fully investigated the effects of risk on the speed with which
firms reverse deviations from their target debt ratios. In this paper, we examine the extent
to which firm-specific and macroeconomic risks affect capital structure adjustment speeds.
We estimate our models using the System GMM dynamic panel data estimator as we focus
on a panel of UK manufacturing firms covering the 1981–2009 period.
To examine the impact of risk on the adjustment of firm’s capital structure, we first
estimate a model that allows firms’ actual leverage to exceed or fall short of the target. We
then extend this model in the spirit of Byoun (2008), as we examine the impact of risk on
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capital structure adjustment decisions of firms that experience financial imbalances when
their actual leverage is above or below the target. For both sets of models, we provide
compelling evidence that different levels and types of risk exert asymmetric effects on the
firm’s capital adjustment process, even after controlling for firms’ financial imbalances and
the deviations of actual leverage from the target.
To address the robustness of our results we carry out five different specifications as we
consider i) target leverage estimates without risk factors, ii) an alternative definition of
leverage measured by total debt/total assets, iii) generating the firm-specific risk measure
after controlling for effects of macroeconomic conditions, iv) alternative measures of risk,
and v) target leverage based on historical leverage. The results from all five specifications
are largely similar to our main findings, supporting the view that both firm-specific and
macroeconomic risks play a significant role in the adjustment of firms’ capital structure.
Overall, our results help us understand why firms may not aggressively act to offset the
effects of changes in their market value of equity or earnings, as it is clear that managers must
carefully consider both the overall state of the economy and their own business activities as
well as the associated risks. Our results also provide evidence that the omission of risk factors
in examining the adjustment of firms’ capital structure will lead to biased conclusions. We
believe that further research along these lines across broader samples of firms would improve
our understanding on the impact of risk on the dynamic adjustment process of firms’ capital
structure.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Firm-Specific Factors
The second, third and fourth columns report the firm-year observations (N), mean and standard deviation (S.D.) of the firm-
specific variables, respectively. The last three columns report the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the firm-specific variables.
The variables are defined as follows. Book leverage is the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets.
The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of
equity divided by the book value of total assets. Investment is the ratio of total expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets
to the total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the total book assets.
Tangibility is defined as the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to the total book assets. The two-year stock return is
the percentage change between share prices at time t and share prices at time t− 2. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net
sales. The non-debt tax shield is defined as total depreciation expense divided by the book value of total assets. The sample
consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data
are drawn from the WorldScope Global database via DataStream.
Variables N Mean S.D. P25 Median P75
Book Leverage
1981–90 1546 0.506 0.176 0.401 0.504 0.608
1991–2000 4387 0.556 0.317 0.379 0.522 0.661
2001–09 7841 0.598 0.568 0.332 0.509 0.689
1981–2009 13774 0.574 0.469 0.358 0.513 0.669
Market-to-Book Value
1981–90 1434 1.491 0.773 1.005 1.279 1.722
1991–2000 4171 2.241 2.691 1.095 1.528 2.242
2001–09 7120 1.987 1.807 1.033 1.424 2.178
1981–2009 12725 2.014 2.077 1.047 1.437 2.136
Investment
1981–90 1917 0.084 0.062 0.042 0.066 0.107
1991–2000 4456 0.066 0.059 0.028 0.051 0.083
2001–09 7766 0.049 0.062 0.012 0.029 0.059
1981–2009 14139 0.059 0.063 0.018 0.041 0.076
Profitability
1981–90 1904 0.166 0.087 0.117 0.161 0.211
1991–2000 4425 0.096 0.257 0.073 0.137 0.197
2001–09 7852 0.001 0.399 -0.007 0.097 0.164
1981–2009 14181 0.053 0.337 0.049 0.121 0.184
Two-year Stock Return
1981–90 1421 0.283 1.187 -0.442 0.288 0.873
1991–2000 3932 0.427 1.351 -0.439 0.438 1.236
2001–09 6715 -0.134 1.722 -1.171 0.113 1.072
1981–2009 12068 0.098 1.575 -0.789 0.249 1.098
Tangibility
1981–90 1922 0.362 0.196 0.229 0.324 0.468
1991–2000 4460 0.348 0.228 0.176 0.311 0.459
2001–09 7907 0.235 0.234 0.050 0.152 0.348
1981–2009 14289 0.287 0.235 0.090 0.243 0.417
Firm Size
1981–90 1931 11.761 1.986 10.321 11.600 13.267
1991–2000 4465 11.229 2.210 9.737 11.019 12.653
2001–09 7932 10.941 2.381 9.155 10.805 12.485
1981–2009 14328 11.141 2.295 9.486 11.003 12.654
Non-debt Tax Shields
1981–90 1904 0.036 0.026 0.022 0.032 0.044
1991-2000 4425 0.046 0.121 0.025 0.038 0.054
2001–09 7852 0.052 0.095 0.022 0.038 0.059
1981–2009 14181 0.048 0.098 0.023 0.037 0.055
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Risk Measures
The second and third columns report the mean and standard deviation (S.D.) of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk, respec-
tively. The last three columns report the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the risk measures. Firm-specific risk is constructed
using data on firms’ sales estimating the following model for each underlying firm:
Salesi,t = µi + ϕSalesi,t−1 + ζit
where Salesi,t denotes the ratio of sales to the book value of total assets for firm i at time t, µi is the constant for firm i,
ϕ is the autoregressive parameter, and ζi,t is the error term with zero mean and finite variance. Residuals are then used to
calculate the cumulative variance for each firm. The square root of the cumulative variance is used as a proxy for firm-specific
risk.
Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. In
order to generate the conditional variance, we estimate the following ARCH(1) model:
∆GDPt = ω + η∆GDPt−1 + t
σ2t = α+ β
2
t−1
where ω is a constant term and η is the autoregressive parameter. The estimated conditional variance, σ̂2t , is the one-period-
ahead forecast variance based on prior information. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London
Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981–2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope Global database via
DataStream. Quarterly data spanning 1975Q1–2009Q4 on seasonally adjusted UK real GDP are taken from the Office for
National Statistics (ONS) database (Pn: A2: ABMI: Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measure).
Variables Mean S.D. P25 Median P75
Firm-Specific Risk
1981–90 0.241 0.287 0.093 0.161 0.289
1991–2000 0.262 0.249 0.118 0.192 0.319
2001–09 0.349 0.503 0.135 0.232 0.399
1981–2009 0.309 0.418 0.124 0.212 0.359
Macroeconomic Risk
1981–90 1.133 0.916 1.455 1.221 1.458
1991–2000 1.328 0.385 1.013 1.323 1.411
2001–09 1.884 1.403 1.189 1.556 2.172
1981–2009 1.779 1.002 1.172 1.440 1.958
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Table 3: Effects of Risk on the Speed of Adjustment while Controlling for Devi-
ations from the Target Leverage
Table 3 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on the
marginal effects of deviations from the target leverage ratio on the adjustment speed for the fol-
lowing model:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dabovi,t + β2Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t + (β3Dabovi,t + β4Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t.Rfirmi,t−1
+ (β5D
abov
i,t + β6D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t.R
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual)
leverage from the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one
if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy
variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time
t, Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk and R
macro
t is a measure of time-varying
macroeconomic risk. Firm-specific risk is drawn from the sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is
proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. Model
1, a modified standard adjustment model of capital structure, reflects our baseline specifications
where the firm capital structure adjustments are interacted with above- and below-target leverage
indicators. Model 2 reflects the interactions among the firm’s capital structure adjustments, above-
and below-target leverage indicators, and our measures of risk. The sample consists of all UK
manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009.
The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream. Panel B of the table reports the
number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying
restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced
residuals, and firm-year observations. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.295 (0.055)*** 0.322 (0.127)***
DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t 0.255 (0.033)*** 0.247 (0.054)***
DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.036 (0.059)
DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.252 (0.140)**
DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.059 (0.029)**
DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.041 (0.170)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 10,943 9,782
Firm 999 963
AR(2) 0.950 1.230
p-value 0.341 0.217
J-statistic 10.290 23.940
p-value 0.740 0.775
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Table 4: The Speed of Adjustment (SOA) for Firms Above and Below the Lever-
age Target at Different Risk Levels
Below are the estimates of the SOA for firms above and below the target leverage ratio at different
risk levels. To calculate the SOA we estimate the model below by using the robust two-step system-
GMM method (results are given in Table 5) and then we calculate the total derivatives at low (25th
percentile), medium (50th percentile), and high (75th percentile) levels of risk.
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dabovi,t + β2Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t + (β3Dabovi,t + β4Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t ×Rfirmi,t−1
+ (β5D
abov
i,t + β6D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rmacrot−1 + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual)
leverage from the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one
if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy
variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time
t, Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk and R
macro
t is a measure of time-varying
macroeconomic risk. Firm-specific risk is drawn from the sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is
proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. The
half-life, the time required for a deviation from the target leverage ratio to be halved, is computed
as ln(0.5)/ln(1 − φ), where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage.
The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any
point over the period 1981–2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope Global database via
DataStream. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Risk Firms Above Target Firms Below Target
Firm Macro SOA EstimatedHalf-Life SOA EstimatedHalf-Life
(Rfirmi,t ) (R
macro
t ) (%) Std.Error Years (%) Std.Error Years
High High 22.1 (0.901)*** 2.78 23.5 (0.034)*** 2.59
High Medium 25.3 (0.098)*** 2.38 21.3 (0.032)*** 2.89
High Low 26.7 (0.103)*** 2.23 20.5 (0.145)** 3.02
Medium High 21.5 (0.091)** 2.86 27.2 (0.301)*** 2.18
Medium Medium 24.7 (0.099)*** 2.44 25.0 (0.029)** 2.41
Medium Low 26.2 (0.103)*** 2.28 24.0 (0.300)*** 2.53
Low High 21.2 (0.091)** 2.91 29.5 (0.035)*** 1.98
Low Medium 24.5 (0.099)** 2.47 27.3 (0.034)*** 2.17
Low Low 25.9 (0.103)*** 2.31 26.0 (0.103)** 2.30
Zero Zero 32.2 (0.128)** 1.78 24.7 (0.054)*** 2.44
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Table 5: Effects of Risk on the Speed of Adjustment while Controlling for Devi-
ations from the Leverage Target and Financial Imbalances
Below are the robust two-step System GMM results of the impact of risk on the marginal effects of deviations from the target
leverage ratio and financial imbalances on the speed of adjustment (SOA) for the following model:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t Dabovi,t + β2Ddefi,t Dabovi,t + β3Dsuri,t Dbeloi,t + β4Ddefi,t Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t (10)
+ (β5D
sur
i,t D
abov
i,t + β6D
def
i,t D
abov
i,t + β7D
sur
i,t D
belo
i,t + β8D
def
i,t D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rfirmi,t
+ (β9D
sur
i,t D
abov
i,t + β10D
def
i,t D
abov
i,t + β11D
sur
i,t D
belo
i,t + β12D
def
i,t D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rmacroi,t
+ (β13D
sur
i,t + β14D
def
i,t ) + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage from the target
leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero
otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise
for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise,
and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Ui,t is a vector
of one-period lagged time-varying firm-specific (Rfirmi,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ). Financial deficit is the ratio of
the change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows to the book value of total assets.
Firm-specific risk is drawn from the sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP
over the period under investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange
at any point over the period 1981–2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope Global database via DataStream. Panel
B of the table reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying
restrictions, the Arellano–Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals and firm-year
observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results: Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Dsuri,t 0.215 (0.081)*** 0.194 (0.078)***
Ddefi,t 0.094 (0.027)*** 0.069 (0.028)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.588 (0.197)*** 0.312 (0.126)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.357 (0.069)*** 0.588 (0.129)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t -0.437 (0.216)** -0.667 (0.301)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t 0.148 (0.033)*** 0.284 (0.109)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.082 (0.039)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.256 (0.128)**
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.207 (0.118)*
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.102 (0.134)
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.169 (0.065)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.269 (0.058)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.095 (0.046)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.037 (0.018)**
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 9,751 9,571
Firms 970 970
AR(2) -0.600 -0.310
p-value 0.552 0.760
J-statistic 45.980 47.980
p-value 0.205 0.252
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Table 6: The Speed of Adjustment for Firms having Above/Below-Target Lever-
age with a Financial Surplus/Deficit at Different Risk Levels
Below are the estimates of the speed of adjustment (SOA) for firms having above- or below-target leverage ratio with a financial
deficit or surplus. To calculate the SOA we estimate the model below by using the robust two-step System GMM method
(results are given in Table 6) and we then calculate the total derivatives at low (25th percentile), medium (50th percentile),
and high (75th percentile) risk levels.
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t Dabovi,t + β2Ddefi,t Dabovi,t + β3Dsuri,t Dbeloi,t + β4Ddefi,t Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t (11)
+ (β5D
sur
i,t D
abov
i,t + β6D
def
i,t D
abov
i,t + β7D
sur
i,t D
belo
i,t + β8D
def
i,t D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rfirmi,t
+ (β9D
sur
i,t D
abov
i,t + β10D
def
i,t D
abov
i,t + β11D
sur
i,t D
belo
i,t + β12D
def
i,t D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rmacroi,t
+ (β13D
sur
i,t + β14D
def
i,t ) + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage from the target
leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero
otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise
for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise,
and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Financial deficit
is the ratio of the change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows to the book value
of total assets. Ui,t is a vector of one-period lagged time-varying firm-specific (R
firm
i,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ).
Firm-specific risk is drawn from sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over
the period under investigation. The half-life, the time required for a deviation from the target leverage ratio to be halved, is
computed as ln(0.5)/ln(1− φ), where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. The sample consists
of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981–2009. The data are
drawn from the WorldScope Global database via DataStream. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Risk Firms Above Target Firms Below Target
Firm Macro SOA Estimated Half-Life SOA Estimated Half-Life
(Rfirmi,t ) (R
macro
t ) (%) Std.Error Years (%) Std.Error Years
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
S
u
r
p
lu
s High High 80.6 (0.269)*** 0.42 -21.2 (0.172) -3.61
High Medium 71.4 (0.282)** 0.55 -26.4 (0.168) -2.96
High Low 67.4 (0.289)** 0.62 -28.7 (0.167)* -2.75
Medium High 81.8 (0.270)*** 0.40 -24.2 (0.192) -3.20
Medium Medium 72.6 (0.283)** 0.54 -29.4 (0.189) -2.69
Medium Low 68.6 (0.289)** 0.60 -31.7 (0.188)* -2.52
Low High 82.5 (0.279)*** 0.39 -26.1 (0.206) -2.99
Low Medium 77.6 (0.284)*** 0.46 -35.1 (0.219) -2.30
Low Low 69.3 (0.290)** 0.59 -33.5 (0.202)* -2.40
Zero Zero 50.6 (0.331)** 0.98 -47.3 (0.227)** -1.79
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
D
e
fi
c
it
High High 22.4 (0.132) 2.73 24.4 (0.041)*** 2.48
High Medium 37.1 (0.119)*** 1.50 26.4 (0.045)*** 2.26
High Low 43.5 (0.116)*** 1.21 27.3 (0.061)*** 2.17
Medium High 18.7 (0.145) 3.35 25.8 (0.056)*** 2.32
Medium Medium 33.3 (0.132)** 1.71 28.0 (0.061)*** 2.11
Medium Low 39.8 (0.145)*** 1.37 28.8 (0.062)*** 2.04
Low High 16.4 (0.153) 3.87 26.8 (0.066)*** 2.22
Low Medium 31.1 (0.140)** 1.86 28.8 (0.071)*** 2.04
Low Low 37.5 (0.136)*** 1.47 29.7 (0.072)*** 1.97
Zero Zero 65.7 (0.146)*** 0.65 35.3 (0.099)*** 1.59
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Table 7: Robustness: The Impacts of Risks on Adjustment Speeds with Target
Leverage Estimated without Risk Factors
Below are the estimates of the speed of adjustment (SOA) for firms having above- or below-target leverage ratio with a financial
deficit or surplus. To calculate the SOA we estimate the model below by using the robust two-step System GMM method
(results are given in Table 6) and we then calculate the total derivatives at low (25th percentile), medium (50th percentile),
and high (75th percentile) risk levels.
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t Dabovi,t + β2Ddefi,t Dabovi,t + β3Dsuri,t Dbeloi,t + β4Ddefi,t Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t (12)
+ (β5D
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i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rfirmi,t
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i,t D
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i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rmacroi,t
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i,t ) + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage from the target
leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero
otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise
for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise,
and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Financial deficit
is the ratio of the change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows to the book value
of total assets. Ui,t is a vector of one-period lagged time-varying firm-specific (R
firm
i,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ).
Firm-specific risk is drawn from sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over
the period under investigation. The half-life, the time required for a deviation from the target leverage ratio to be halved, is
computed as ln(0.5)/ln(1− φ), where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. The sample consists
of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981–2009. The data are
drawn from the WorldScope Global database via DataStream. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively.
Risk Firms Above Target Firms Below Target
Firm Macro SOA Estimated Half-Life SOA Estimated Half-Life
(Rfirmi,t ) (R
macro
t ) (%) Std.Error Years (%) Std.Error Years
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
S
u
r
p
lu
s High High 79.2 (0.234)*** 0.44 -09.8 (0.165) -7.39
High Medium 70.6 (0.257)*** 0.57 -13.5 (0.173) -5.46
High Low 66.9 (0.216)*** 0.63 -15.2 (0.157) -4.91
Medium High 80.3 (0.234)*** 0.43 -15.1 (0.209) -4.91
Medium Medium 71.7 (0.218)*** 0.55 -18.9 (0.187) -4.01
Medium Low 68.0 (0.227)*** 0.61 -20.5 (0.195) -3.72
Low High 81.0 (0.228)*** 0.42 -18.4 (0.232) -4.11
Low Medium 72.4 (0.273)*** 0.54 -22.1 (0.265) -3.47
Low Low 68.7 (0.241)*** 0.60 -23.7 (0.291) -3.26
Zero Zero 51.2 (0.189)*** 0.97 -36.2 (0.176)** -2.24
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
D
e
fi
c
it
High High 17.6 (0.135) 3.59 24.4 (0.032)*** 2.48
High Medium 29.2 (0.103)*** 2.01 26.4 (0.047)*** 2.26
High Low 34.3 (0.112)*** 1.65 27.2 (0.059)*** 2.18
Medium High 12.8 (0.142) 5.08 26.0 (0.063)*** 2.30
Medium Medium 24.4 (0.076)*** 2.48 28.0 (0.052)*** 2.11
Medium Low 29.5 (0.084)*** 1.98 28.9 (0.057)*** 2.03
Low High 09.8 (0.143) 6.68 27.1 (0.072)*** 2.20
Low Medium 21.5 (0.076)*** 2.86 29.0 (0.069)*** 2.02
Low Low 26.6 (0.093)*** 2.24 29.9 (0.062)*** 1.95
Zero Zero 47.5 (0.117)*** 1.08 35.5 (0.087)*** 1.58
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Table 8: Robustness: An Alternative Measure of Leverage and the Impacts of
Risks on Adjustment Speeds
Below are the estimates of the speed of adjustment (SOA) for firms having above- or below-target leverage ratio with a financial
deficit or surplus. To calculate the SOA we estimate the model below by using the robust two-step System GMM method
(results are given in Table 6) and we then calculate the total derivatives at low (25th percentile), medium (50th percentile),
and high (75th percentile) risk levels.
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t Dabovi,t + β2Ddefi,t Dabovi,t + β3Dsuri,t Dbeloi,t + β4Ddefi,t Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t (13)
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where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage from the target
leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero
otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise
for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise,
and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Financial deficit
is the ratio of the change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows to the book value
of total assets. Ui,t is a vector of one-period lagged time-varying firm-specific (R
firm
i,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ).
Firm-specific risk is drawn from sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over
the period under investigation. The half-life, the time required for a deviation from the target leverage ratio to be halved, is
computed as ln(0.5)/ln(1− φ), where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. The sample consists
of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981–2009. The data are
drawn from the WorldScope Global database via DataStream. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively.
Risk Firms Above Target Firms Below Target
Firm Macro SOA Estimated Half-Life SOA Estimated Half-Life
(Rfirmi,t ) (R
macro
t ) (%) Std.Error Years (%) Std.Error Years
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
S
u
r
p
lu
s High High 77.4 (0.227)*** 0.47 -10.8 (0.175) -6.77
High Medium 68.0 (0.218)*** 0.61 -13.6 (0.168) -5.43
High Low 63.9 (0.203)*** 0.68 -14.9 (0.182) -5.00
Medium High 79.4 (0.254)*** 0.44 -16.0 (0.197) -4.67
Medium Medium 70.0 (0.220)*** 0.57 -18.9 (0.182) -4.01
Medium Low 65.9 (0.226)*** 0.64 -20.1 (0.189) -3.78
Low High 80.7 (0.265)*** 0.42 -19.2 (0.234) -3.95
Low Medium 71.3 (0.205)*** 0.56 -22.0 (0.217) -3.48
Low Low 67.1 (0.211)*** 0.62 -23.3 (0.287) -3.31
Zero Zero 48.7 (0.143)*** 1.04 -33.8 (0.138)** -2.38
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
D
e
fi
c
it
High High 18.2 (0.137) 3.45 27.3 (0.034)*** 2.18
High Medium 29.0 (0.098)*** 2.02 28.8 (0.054)*** 2.04
High Low 33.8 (0.113)*** 1.68 29.4 (0.078)*** 1.99
Medium High 13.0 (0.156) 4.96 29.0 (0.043)*** 2.02
Medium Medium 23.9 (0.072)*** 2.54 30.5 (0.058)*** 1.91
Medium Low 28.6 (0.086)*** 2.06 31.1 (0.059)*** 1.86
Low High 09.9 (0.176) 6.65 30.1 (0.079)*** 1.94
Low Medium 20.7 (0.087)** 2.99 31.5 (0.053)*** 1.83
Low Low 25.5 (0.067)*** 2.36 32.2 (0.061)*** 1.79
Zero Zero 44.3 (0.113)*** 1.18 36.8 (0.067)*** 1.51
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Table 9: Robustness: The Impacts of Risks on Adjustment Speeds with Macroe-
conomic Conditions-Adjusted Firm-Specific Risk
Below are the estimates of the speed of adjustment (SOA) for firms having above- or below-target leverage ratio with a financial
deficit or surplus. To calculate the SOA we estimate the model below by using the robust two-step System GMM method
(results are given in Table 6) and we then calculate the total derivatives at low (25th percentile), medium (50th percentile),
and high (75th percentile) risk levels.
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t Dabovi,t + β2Ddefi,t Dabovi,t + β3Dsuri,t Dbeloi,t + β4Ddefi,t Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t (14)
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where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage from the target
leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero
otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise
for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise,
and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Financial
deficit is the ratio of the change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows to the book
value of total assets. Ui,t is a vector of one-period lagged time-varying firm-specific (R
firm
i,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ).
Firm-specific risk is drawn from sales of firms after controlling for macroeconomic conditions (log of real GDP and log of CPI are
also included in the specification). Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period
under investigation. The half-life, the time required for a deviation from the target leverage ratio to be halved, is computed as
ln(0.5)/ln(1 − φ), where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. The sample consists of all UK
manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981–2009. The data are drawn from the
WorldScope Global database via DataStream. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Risk Firms Above Target Firms Below Target
Firm Macro SOA Estimated Half-Life SOA Estimated Half-Life
(Rfirmi,t ) (R
macro
t ) (%) Std.Error Years (%) Std.Error Years
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
S
u
r
p
lu
s High High 80.1 (0.237)*** 0.43 -13.3 (0.189) -5.55
High Medium 70.2 (0.281)*** 0.57 -16.7 (0.177) -4.49
High Low 65.8 (0.233)*** 0.65 -18.2 (0.192) -4.15
Medium High 82.2 (0.242)*** 0.40 -18.6 (0.215) -4.07
Medium Medium 72.3 (0.213)*** 0.54 -22.0 (0.287) -3.49
Medium Low 67.9 (0.241)*** 0.61 -23.5 (0.194) -3.29
Low High 83.5 (0.252)*** 0.38 -21.8 (0.253) -3.52
Low Medium 73.5 (0.231)*** 0.52 -25.2 (0.276) -3.09
Low Low 69.2 (0.214)*** 0.59 -26.7 (0.259) -2.93
Zero Zero 49.6 (0.145)*** 1.01 -38.4 (0.165)** -2.13
F
in
a
n
c
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l
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e
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c
it
High High 18.8 (0.154) 3.32 25.6 (0.032)*** 2.34
High Medium 29.7 (0.058)*** 1.97 27.2 (0.047)*** 2.19
High Low 34.4 (0.101)*** 1.64 27.8 (0.059)*** 2.13
Medium High 13.8 (0.187) 4.66 27.5 (0.063)*** 2.16
Medium Medium 24.6 (0.065)*** 2.45 29.0 (0.052)*** 2.02
Medium Low 29.4 (0.082)*** 1.99 29.7 (0.057)*** 1.97
Low High 10.8 (0.165) 6.08 28.6 (0.072)*** 2.05
Low Medium 21.6 (0.073)*** 2.85 30.2 (0.069)*** 1.93
Low Low 26.3 (0.061)*** 2.27 30.8 (0.062)*** 1.88
Zero Zero 45.3 (0.098)*** 1.15 35.7 (0.098)*** 1.57
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Table 10: Robustness: Alternative Measures of Risk and the Alternative Estimate
of Firms’ Target Leverage
Table 10 reports results from estimating the following model for alternative measures of risk and the alternative measure of the
firm target leverage levels:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t Dabovi,t + β2Ddefi,t Dabovi,t + β3Dsuri,t Dbeloi,t + β4Ddefi,t Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t (15)
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where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage from the target
leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero
otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise
for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise,
and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Ui,t is a vector
of one-period lagged time-varying firm-specific (Rfirmi,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ). Firm-specific risk is drawn from
firms’ cash flow realizations. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of Consumer Price Index (CPI) over
the period under investigation. Financial deficit is the ratio of the change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus
dividends less net cash flows to the book value of total assets. Model 1 estimates the effect of our alternative measures of
risk on adjustments, while Model 2 quantifies the effect of risk on adjustments when the firm target leverage is proxied by the
historical mean of the firm leverage. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange
at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream. Panel B of the
table reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions,
the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, and firm-year observations.
*** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Dsuri,t 0.197 (0.081)*** 0.164 (0.041)***
Ddefi,t 0.081 (0.027)*** 0.064 (0.016)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.433 (0.197)*** 0.372 (0.123)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.610 (0.069)*** 0.568 (0.075)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t -0.866 (0.216)** -0.609 (0.167)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t 0.225 (0.033)*** 0.474 (0.054)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.210 (0.018)*** -0.087 (0.025)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.019 (0.001)*** 0.215 (0.088)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.063 (0.003)*** 0.258 (0.031)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.001 (0.001) -0.111 (0.018)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.659 (0.256)*** 0.141 (0.036)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -2.146 (0.442)*** -0.221 (0.035)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 1.627 (0.518)*** 0.061 (0.025)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.298 (0.097)*** -0.046 (0.013)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 9,751 9,751
Firm 970 970
AR(2) -0.790 0.310
p-value 0.428 0.757
J-statistic 34.240 74.770
p-value 0.159 0.241
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Appendix A
Table A: Estimated Capital Structure Adjustment Speeds
in Prior Empirical Studies
The second and third columns of the table report the estimated annual capital structure speeds of adjustment (SOA) and
half-life: the time required for a deviation from the target capital structure to be halved, respectively. The half-life is computed
as ln(0.5)/ln(1 − φ), where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward the leverage target. All reported estimates
of the speed of adjustments are based on book leverage except Flannery and Rangan (2006), who used the market leverage in
their study. The speed of adjustment from Kayhan and Titman (2007) is an annualized rate based on five-year rate reported
in their paper, Table 2. The estimated annual speed of adjustment from Antoniou et al. (2008) is for UK and US firms in their
Table 5.
Article Sample Period Country SOA Half-Life
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 1966–1978 USA 56.1%a, 10.9%b 0.8, 6.0 years
Ozkan (2001) 1984–1996 UK 56.9% 0.8 years
Fama and French (2002) 1965–1999 USA 10.0%c, 18.0%d 6.6, 3.5 years
Flannery and Rangan (2006) 1965–2001 USA 34.0% 1.7 years
Kayhan and Titman (2007) 1960–2003 USA 10.0% 6.6 years
Flannery and Hankins (2007) 1968–2004 USA 22.0% 2.8 years
Xu (2007) 1970–2004 USA 18.0% 3.5 years
Lemmon et al. (2008) 1963–2003 USA 25.0% 2.4 years
Antoniou et al. (2008) 1987–2000 UK, USA 32.0%e, 32.2%f 1.8, 1.8 years
Byoun (2008) 1971–2003 USA 33.0%g, 20.0%h 1.7, 3.1 years
Brav (2009) 1997–2003 UK 10.2%j , 22.5%k 6.4, 2.7 years
Huang and Ritter (2009) 1963–2001 USA 17.0% 3.7 years
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) 1971–2004 USA 37.8% 1.4 years
Elsas and Florysiak (2010) 1965–2009 USA 26.0% 2.3 years
Cook and Tang (2010) 1977–2006 USA 46.1%m, 43.7%n 1.1, 1.2 years
Elsas and Florysiak (2011) 1965–2009 USA 50.5%0, 45.0%p 1.0, 1.1 years
Faulkender et al. (2012) 1965–2006 USA 22.9%q, 69.3%r 2.6, 0.6 years
aFor debt financing.
bFor equity financing.
cFirms that pay dividends.
dFirms that do not pay dividends.
eUK firms.
fUS firms.
gFirms that are above target leverage and have a financial surplus.
hFirms that are above target leverage and have a financial deficit.
jPublic firms.
kPrivate firms.
mWhen the economy in an expansionary phase.
nWhen the economy in a recessionary phase.
0Highly over-levered firms.
pHighly under-levered firms.
qUnder-levered firms with near-zero cash flow realization.
rOver-levered firms with excess cash flow realization.
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Appendix B
Table B: Variable Definitions
Variables Definition
Book leverage The ratio of book debt to the book value of total assets.
Book debt Total assets less the book value of equity.
Book equity Total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred
taxes and convertible debt.
Market-to-book
value
The book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus
the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets.
Profitability The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to the
book value of total assets.
Firm size Natural logarithm of net sales.
Non-debt tax shield Ratio of total depreciation expense to the book value of total assets.
Tangibility The ratio of net plant, property and equipment to the book value
of assets.
Investment The ratio of total capital expenditures to the book value of total
assets.
Two-year stock re-
turns
Difference between share prices at time t and share prices at time
t− 2.
Financial deficit The ratio of the change in working capital plus investment plus
dividends less net cash flow to the book value of total assets.
Target leverage Estimated from the regression of observed leverage on the firm-
specific variables and risk measures.
Leverage deviation Deviations of current leverage from the target leverage ratio.
Firm-specific risk Drawn from net sales of firms scaled by the book value of total
assets.
Macroeconomic risk Proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP obtained from
the ARCH model.
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Appendix C
Table C: ARCH Model Estimates for Macroeconomic Risk
Panel A reports the estimates obtained by estimating the ARCH(1) model for real gross domestic (GDP) over the period
1975Q1-2009Q4. Specifically, allowing an ARMA term in the mean equation we estimate the following mean and variance
equations simultaneously:
∆GDPt = ω + η∆GDPt−1 + t
σ2t = α+ β
2
t−1
where ω is a constant term and η is the autoregressive parameter. The conditional variance, σ2t , is the one-period-
ahead forecast variance based on prior information. α is a constant term and |∆GDPt−1 ∼ N(0, σ2t−1) is the innova-
tion in real GDP. In the variance equation, the weights are (1-α, β) and the long-run average variance is
√
α/(1− β),
where α > 0 and 0 < β < 1. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors. The estimates of the
log-likelihood, Lagrange multiplier (ARCH LM) test and Q-statistics to test for the remaining ARCH effects in the
model are given in Panel B. Seasonally adjusted quarterly data spanning 1975Q1–2009Q4 on UK real GDP are taken
from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) database (Pn: A2: ABMI: Gross Domestic Product: chained vol-
ume measure). Statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level is indicated by three and two asterisks, respectively.
Panel A: ARCH(1) Estimates
Regressors
∆GDP
Coefficients Std.Error
∆GDP t−1 0.777 (8.450)***
Constant 0.415 (0.159)***
AR(1) -0.808 (0.059)***
MA(1) 0.346 (0.153)**
MA(2) -0.532 (0.140)***
ARCH(1) 0.781 (0.234)***
Constant 0.813 (0.161)***
Panel B: Tests for remaining ARCH effects
Log-likelihood -233.961
Observations 139.000
LM-test(4) 0.610
P-value 0.962
LM-test(8) 1.050
P-value 0.994
Q(4) 1.128
P-value 0.889
Q(8) 2.527
P-value 0.960
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Appendix D
Table D: Robust Two-step System GMM Estimates for the Determinants
of Leverage
Below are the robust two-step System GMM estimates for the following model:
Li,t = β0 + β1Xi,t−1 + β2Rfirmi,t−1 + β3R
macro
i,t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of the book leverage of firm i in year t. Xi,t is a vector of the firm-specific variables. R
firm
i,t is a measure
of time-varying firm-specific risk. Rmacrot is a measure of time-varying macroeconomic risk. The term υi captures the effects of
time-invariant unobservable firm-specific factors. The term εi,t represents the time-varying residuals. Subscripts i and t denote
firm and time period, respectively. The variables are defined as follows. Book leverage is the ratio of the book value of total
debt to the book value of total assets. The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of the total book assets
less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Investment is the ratio
of total expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to the book value of total assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings
before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the total book assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment
to the total book assets. The two-year stock return is the percentage change between share prices at time t and share prices at
time t− 2. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales. The non-debt tax shield is defined as total depreciation expense
divided by the book value of total assets. Firm-specific risk is drawn from sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the
conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms
listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981–2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope Global
database via DataStream. Panel B reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a test of
the over identifying restrictions, and the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced
residuals. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors Coefficient Std. Error
Leveragei,t−1 0.688 (0.093)***
Market-to-Booki,t−1 -0.011 (0.005)**
Investmenti,t−1 0.402 (0.128)***
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.251 (0.130)**
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.429 (0.135)***
Firm Sizei,t−1 0.034 (0.013)***
Two-year Stock Returni,t−1 -0.120 (0.016)***
Non-debt Tax Shieldsi,t−1 0.772 (0.388)**
Rfirmi,t−1 -0.101 (0.032)**
Rmacrot−1 -0.006 (0.002)***
Constant -0.245 (0.124)**
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 10,882
Firms 994
AR(2) -0.890
p-value 0.373
J-statistic 57.620
p-value 0.379
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